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Unfortunately I have no "code" that you could post. We never had code from the "O" CCcam, only what you could do reverse engineering by using a debugger. And there was the "CCcam Protocol analyzer, can be found via google, as you can see only the commands, which are also used.
Using the analysis of the codes "that was meant to debug the CCcam - ie naked assembler code. Since there is a switch statement that responds to this CMD_0A - as far as I remember, but that's some time ago.

Habs found. It was NOT CMD_0A but CMD_0E:

Code:
0x0E
Code:
.text:080D7138 cmd_0x0E:                               ; CODE XREF: Command_Handler+A6j
.text:080D7138                                         ; DATA XREF: .rodata:off_80F4484o
.text:080D7138 call    sub_80D5B30                     ; jumptable 080D70E6 case 14
.text:080D713D xor     ebx, ebx
.text:080D713F jmp     exit_cmd_handler

No idea yet, string required??

0x0A
Code:
.text:080D7643 cmd_0x0A:                               ; CODE XREF: Command_Handler+A6j
.text:080D7643                                         ; DATA XREF: .rodata:off_80F4484o
.text:080D7643 mov     esi, [ebp+var_A0C]              ; jumptable 080D70E6 case 10
.text:080D7649 xor     ebx, ebx
.text:080D764B mov     [esp], esi
.text:080D764E call    sub_80A6820
.text:080D7653 jmp     exit_cmd_handler

It looks like cmd 0x0A (only header without payload) is requesting a answer of cmd 0x0B. After the command 0x0A from the client the server will send once 16 bytes with the cmd 0x0B.
As already said, this was not followed and can be anything.

---------- Post added at 19:55 ---------- Previous post was at 19:37 ----------

Si ca sa va lamutiti in versiunea 3906 s-a facut deja blocarea comenzilor.

08:53 Changeset [3906] by schlocke
cccam: Blocking user if cccam-backdoor commands detected